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Michael Leifer observes Singapore-India relations to be ‘diplomatically distant’. This observation 
was correct during the Cold War when diff  ering political ideologies made it diffi   cult for these two 
countries to develop close relations. With the end of the Cold War, bilateral relations improved 
rapidly, especially on the economic front. Consequently, most literature focuses on the economic 
interaction between them, at the expense of other signiﬁ  cant developments on the political, 
military as well as social and cultural fronts. In order to better understand Singapore-India 
relations in the present, a well-rounded approach is necessary. Hence, this article addresses this 
lacuna in the present scholarship by providing a comprehensive overview that takes into account 
developments in both the areas of high and low politics. In so doing, this article argues that 
Singapore-India relations are now no longer ‘diplomatically distant’, but instead mirror the close 
relations they had during the colonial period, and so represent a ‘return to history’ instead.
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Michael  Leifer  beschreibt  die  Beziehungen  zwischen  Singapur  und  Indien  als  „diplomatisch 
distanziert“. Diese Beobachtung war während des Kalten Krieges korrekt, als unterschiedliche 
politische Ideologien eine enge Zusammenarbeit dieser beiden Länder erschwerten. Mit dem Ende 
des Kalten Krieges verbesserten sich bilaterale Beziehungen – vor allem im wirtschaftlichen Bereich 
– rapide. Aus diesem Grund konzentrieren sich die meisten Publikationen auf die wirtschaftliche 
Interaktion der beiden Länder und vernachlässigen gleichzeitig weitere wichtige Entwicklungen 
in der politischen, militärischen, sozialen und kulturellen Sphäre. Um die Beziehungen zwischen 
Singapur und Indien besser zu verstehen, ist ein vielseitigerer Ansatz notwendig. Der vorliegende 
Artikel  versucht  diese  Lücke  gegenwärtiger  Forschung  zu  schließen  und  einen  umfassenden 
Überblick der Entwicklungen in den Bereichen high politics und low politics zu geben. Dabei wird 
argumentiert, dass die Beziehungen zwischen Singapur und Indien nicht mehr länger „diplomatisch 
distanziert“ seien, sondern – im Gegenteil – die enge Beziehung der beiden Länder während der 
Kolonialzeit widerspiegelt. Demnach repräsentieren sie eine „Rückkehr zur Geschichte“.
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Introduction 
Michael Leifer’s authoritative work on Singapore’s foreign policy describes Singapore-
India relations to be ‘diplomatically distant’ (Leifer, 2000, p. 129). A survey of works 
on Singapore’s foreign policy also supports Leifer’s belief since ‘India’ only appears 
sporadically in the indexes (Ganesan, 2005; Latif, 2007; Regnier, 1991; B. Singh, 1999). 
This  lack  of  scholarly  interest  was  understandable  during  the  Cold  War,  when 
differing ideologies prevented the two countries from developing warm bilateral ties 
even though they were historically very close. However, with the Cold War over, both 
states are now making up for lost time as demonstrated by the great strides made in 
their bilateral relations, especially on the economic front. Predictably, most scholarly 
attention has focused on this issue (Asher & Raja, 1994; Yahya, 2008), at the expense 
of significant developments in other aspects of their bilateral relations. This article 
addresses this lacuna in the literature by presenting a comprehensive overview of 
their bilateral relationship that takes into account not only developments on the 
economic front, but also developments on the political, defence, as well as social 
and cultural fronts. Arguably, such rapid improvements are possible because they are 
congruent with Singapore’s objectives of achieving a hospitable regional order through 
the establishment of a balance of power, and distancing itself against allegations of 
being a Sinic outpost. Singapore’s present engagement of India therefore echoes the 
previously close links between them, and so represents a return to history.
India-Singapore Relations: A Primer
Singapore’s present closer links with India are not unexpected as their ties have 
‘ancient and deep roots’ (Shanmugaratnam, 2007, para. 2). Britain founded Singapore 
to  service  the  lucrative  India-China  trade  route.  As  was  to  be  expected,  during 
British rule, Singapore’s government, as well as its penal code, were based on the 
Indian model. Furthermore, due to the presence of economic opportunities, many 
ethnic Indians sought employment in Singapore. Hence, it is clear that Singapore 
had close links with India since its founding. Singapore did not forget its ‘debt’ to 
India after becoming independent in 1965. On Indira Gandhi’s 1966 visit to Singapore, 
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Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew affirmed the important similarities between them. 
Correspondingly, in 1970, when V. S. Giri visited Singapore, the first by an Indian 
President, Singapore’s President Benjamin Sheares also emphasized their historically 
close links. However, even though bilateral relations at the official level remained 
correct,  they  were  neither  substantial  nor  warm  during  the  Cold  War  due  to 
ideological differences.
Bilateral  relations  only  improved  after  the  Cold  War  as  both  states  made  a 
conscious  commitment  to  increase  their  interactions.  Hence,  George  Yeo,  in  his 
former capacity as Singapore’s Minister for Trade and Industry, was able to emphasize 
the close historical links between Singapore and India and stated it was logical for 
them to cooperate in the contemporary context (Yeo, 2004, para. 3). Elaborating 
on  Yeo’s  observation,  Raymond  Lim,  Singapore’s  Minister  of  State  for  Trade  and 
Foreign Affairs, provides a more detailed explanation as to why Singapore and India 
are developing closer bilateral relations so rapidly after the Cold War by outlining 
Singapore’s ‘4C’ value proposition – Capital, Connectivity, Capabilities, Comfort – to 
India. 
As a regional financial hub, Singapore’s banking and financial markets are well-
developed and make it easier for Indian companies to raise capital. Given Singapore’s 
excellent geographical position, it has extensive transport links with many states, 
making it a good transport hub for Indian exports. Furthermore, Singapore also has 
a dense network of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that stretches from Asia to Europe 
and to North America, providing Indian firms in Singapore access to major markets. 
Without any natural resources except for the human variety, Singapore has invested 
much attention into improving its human capital, a move that complements India’s 
role as a major actor in a knowledge-based economy. 
The above three factors are very important. However, they can also be found or 
replicated in neighbouring states. Comfort, therefore, holds the most value. Comfort 
arises due to the long history of contact between Singapore and India during the 
colonial period. Consequently, Indian culture, values and cuisine have taken root in 
Singapore and this high level of familiarity is a big pull factor (Lim, 2004, Comfort, 
para. 1). “Just as India has looked east, Singapore has looked west towards India. 
Our ties are intertwined through history, language and culture” (Goh, 2004, para. 
5). Hence, this new wave of interaction between India and Singapore after the Cold 
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War can be characterized, in Kagan’s parlance (2008), though out of context, as an 
optimistic ‘return to history’. 
India’s Cold War Foreign Policy
The  current  close  relations  between  Singapore  and  India  are  in  sharp  contrast 
to  their  distant  relations  during  the  Cold  War.  When  India  became  independent 
in  1947,  it  regarded  non-alignment  as  a  manifestation  of  its  sovereign  ability  to 
implement its foreign policy that was formerly under British control. With India’s 
professed commitment towards non-alignment, it had strong reservations against 
policies that entailed involving foreign powers in Asia. Consequently, India opposed 
the  establishment  of  multilateral  institutions  such  as  the  Southeast  Asia  Treaty 
Organization (SEATO). India perceived SEATO, which was modelled after NATO as a 
continuation of Western presence in Asia and was anathema to what India stood 
for (Ayoob, 1990, p. 10; Jain, 2008, p. 31). This was because Western states such as 
Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States were 
members of this organization. SEATO’s primary objective was to block communist 
gains by establishing a system of collective defence. With Pakistan as a member, 
India naturally felt threatened. At the same time, India’s Soviet links also meant 
that inherent antagonism was present. During this period, although Singapore was 
not a member of SEATO, it identified more closely with Western states such as the 
United States and Britain, which India did not have good relations with. Due to such 
differences, it was politically difficult for India to have close diplomatic relations 
with newly independent South-East Asian states such as Singapore that was pro-West 
during the Cold War.
Apart  from  political  considerations,  India’s  inward  looking  economic  policy 
further reduced interaction between India and South-East Asian states. Upon its 
independence in 1947, India used import substitution to start the industrialization 
process and be less economically dependent on Western states (Desai, 1972). India’s 
decision to do so resulted from its experience with the British East India Company 
(EIC) during the colonial period. Then, large-scale importation of British manufactured 
goods undermined the viability of small-scale Indian enterprises (Clark, 2007, pp. 319-
327; Hagerty, 2005, p. 14). In the words of Karl Marx, “England has broken down 
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the entire framework of Indian society, without any symptoms of reconstitution 
yet appearing” (Marx, 1965, p. 25). Elaborating, Marx notes that the “hand-loom and 
the spinning wheel … were the pivots of the structure of that society… [and it] was 
the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand-loom and destroyed the spinning 
wheel” (Marx, 1965, p. 27). Furthermore, dependency theory, which advocated newly-
independent states to decouple their national economies from the world market was 
en vogue then. Due to the combination of these two factors, it was unsurprising that 
India developed reservations towards integrating itself with the global economy, one 
that Western states dominated.
Ironically, India needed external assistance as it lacked the indigenous capacity to 
develop its heavy industries. Given its wary attitudes towards the West, India sought 
assistance from the Soviet Union instead, whose help was instrumental in India’s 
establishment of the steel and heavy machines plants in Bhilai and Ranchi. A sign of 
the closer bilateral relations was that the Soviet Union became a major destination 
of Indian exports during the 1960s and 1970s. During this period, the percentage of 
Indian exports to Britain fell drastically, from 26.9 percent in 1960 to 11.1 percent in 
1971, while its exports to the Soviet Union increased from 4.5 percent to 13.7 percent 
within (Nayyar, 1976, p. 29), which was unsurprising since they signed a Treaty of 
Peace, Friendship and Co-operation in 1971. The objective of this treaty was to allow 
the Soviet Union to establish a strong geopolitical presence in South Asia, which 
checked American and Chinese involvement in the region, most notably during the 
conflict between India and Pakistan in the same year. These closer links between 
India and the Soviet Union came about after the United States supplied arms to 
Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. To counter Pakistan’s offensive, India 
looked towards the Soviet Union for the sale of advanced weaponry. Over time, India 
developed a ‘weapon dependence’ on the Soviet Union (Jain, 2008, pp. 110-111).
India’s Political Alignment with the Soviet Union
Through aligning with the Soviet Union, India was attempting to minimize British and 
American influence in the sub-continent. In addition, India also sought to prevent 
China developing closer ties with the Soviet Union and Pakistan. India’s objective 
of cultivating ties with the Soviet Union was therefore to deny or restrict China’s 
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diplomatic presence in South Asia, which India regards as its traditional sphere of 
influence (Jain, 2008, p. 21). 
However, India’s Soviet links were detrimental to its relations with South-East Asian 
states such as Singapore. During the Cold War, the threat of Communist expansion, 
as reflected by military situations in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, meant that South-
East Asian states considered India, with its Soviet relations, to be politically suspect. 
In  December  1979,  the  Soviet  Union’s  invasion  of  Afghanistan  became  another 
obstacle for the normalization of relations between India and South-East Asian states 
as Soviet action went against the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) 
commitment to non-intervention and respect for sovereignty (Koh, 1978).
India’s formal recognition in July 1980 of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin 
regime that overthrew the Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia also strained its 
relations with South-East Asian states (Latif, 2008, pp. 72-73). Although the Khmer 
Rouge government committed genocide against its own people, Singapore consistently 
maintained that the lack of effective internal governance standards did not justify 
Vietnam’s military intervention that infringed upon Cambodia’s sovereignty (Koh, 
1980). India’s recognition of the Heng Samrin regime was therefore a serious political 
faux pas that led to a further deterioration of their ties (Warbrick, 1981, pp. 238-239; 
Yong & Rao, 1995, pp. 28-29). 
Senior Singapore diplomats such as Tommy Koh and Sinnathamby Rajaratnam 
officially condemned these “aggressive” acts in various multilateral organizations 
such as the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. As a miniscule state, 
Singapore has heightened sensitivity towards any challenge to a state’s sovereignty. 
Given Singapore’s stance against external intervention (Rajaratmam, 1979, pp. 637-
638; Koh, 1978; 1980), India’s association with, and tacit approval and support of 
Soviet policies minimized any opportunities for constructive engagement between 
Singapore and India; relations were therefore mutually “uncomfortable and insecure” 
during this period (Devare, 2006, p. xi). 
India’s ‘Look East’ Policy
However, this period of poor bilateral relations, in hindsight, proved to be an interlude. 
With the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the Cold War ended. India was, according to C. 
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Raja Mohan, “in deep mourning” (Mohan, 2007, p. 102). It lost a valuable and long-time 
political and economic ally. A stark choice confronted India. It could either “persist 
with an inward-looking policy that marginalizes the country and slides it inexorably 
into increasing international irrelevance. Or it can take a good hard look at itself and 
at other former developing countries that have achieved success essentially by dint of 
their own efforts” (Thakur, 1992, p. 165). Hence, Manmohan Singh, the then-Finance 
Minister, introduced economic liberalisation to overcome the problems associated 
with  the  previously  autarkic  policy.  One  of  the  most  significant  new  initiatives 
introduced in the wake of India’s changing orientation was the ‘Look East’ policy that 
sought to increase India’s economic interaction with South-East Asian states through 
pursuing economic liberalization
The ‘Look East’ policy was not entirely new. Before the Cold War ended, India 
had already begun to make overtures to South-East Asian states through its ‘Look 
East Destiny’ policy (Shaumian, 1988, p. 1167). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
South-East Asian states such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia were experiencing 
rapid and sustained economic growth. In contrast, India’s economic performance 
was very poor. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao then launched the ‘Look East’ policy 
in  1992  to  increase  India’s  engagement  with  these  economically  dynamic  states, 
especially Singapore, so as to learn from their economic and development experiences 
(Mahbubani,  2008).  Apart  from  reaping  economic  benefits,  India  also  wanted  to 
improve its bilateral relations with them as well so as not to remain diplomatically 
isolated after the Cold War. China was increasing its presence in South-East Asia 
after  Deng  Xiaoping  introduced  economic  reforms  in  1978.  Having  lost  a  major 
ally in the Soviet Union, it was not in India’s interest to have China dominate the 
region, especially one that is so geographically close. Furthermore, China also gained 
significant diplomatic momentum and by the early 1990s, it had established formal 
relations with economically vibrant Asian states such as South Korea, Indonesia and 
Singapore. India had to respond to such geopolitical changes.
At the end of the Cold War, apart from membership in the South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), India was not party to any other economic blocs. 
By implementing the ‘Look East’ policy, India planned to leverage on its new ties 
with South-East Asian states to gain membership in various groupings such as the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) that 
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would be economically and politically beneficial for India (Gupta, 1997, p. 307; Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS], 2003, p. 42). India’s fundamental objective was to 
first establish an economic presence in the region, a conduit that could then lead to 
an increased political presence at a later stage (Mohan, 2003, pp. 211-213). 
When India first implemented its ‘Look East’ policy, it focused most attention on 
Singapore. Apart from Singapore’s excellent geographical location and its national 
role conception as a trading state, it is also the economically most developed state in 
South-East Asia, and so it was natural for the city-state to be India’s focal entry point 
into the region. Manmohan Singh believed that to “market New India, [we] would 
have to begin in Singapore” (M. Singh quoted in Goh, 2008, para. 23), India’s post-Cold 
War interaction and engagement with Singapore provided the former with access 
to the region, and laid the foundations for the later establishment of the Mekong-
Ganga Cooperation and the BIMSTEC Forum, which entrenched India’s presence in 
South-East Asia. With deepening levels of interactions, India is rapidly becoming a 
major actor in South-East Asia. Hence, Manmohan Singh believes “the ‘Look East’ 
policy is more than a slogan, or a foreign policy orientation. It has a strong economic 
rationale and commercial content. We wish to look east because of the centuries of 
interactions between us” (M. Singh, 2004b, para. 4). 
Economic Developments
Michael Leifer (2000, p. 14) observed that: “Singapore is primarily about the business 
of business”, and for Singapore to carry on with its business, Yusuf Ishak, Singapore’s 
first President, opined that:
[I]n the long run, our viability depends upon having the widest spread of economic links with the largest 
number of countries, that is, the world, so that the economic levers will not be in the hands of a few 
governments (Ishak quoted in B. Singh, 1999, p. 26).
This observation is hardly surprising since Singapore is a trading state. Apart from 
not wanting a rising China to dominate the region politically, Singapore also does not 
want China to dominate the region economically. This is because China implemented 
its  economic  reforms  before  India  did  and  so  enjoys  a  substantial  advantage. 
Furthermore, Singapore’s attempts at breaking into the Chinese market have not 
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been very successful. Singapore’s experience in cooperating with China to set up the 
Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) is instructive. Despite having the professed support of the 
Chinese government as well as perceived cultural affinity between them, the project 
did not pan out the way Singapore envisioned. Despite receiving endorsement and 
support from the two governments, Singapore discovered that China’s business, as 
well as its political climates, were very different from Singapore’s. Cooperation was 
difficult due to the diffusion of control over the project from the central government 
to the local government. The SIP was supposed to receive preferential treatment but 
the local Suzhou government set up a similar industrial park – Suzhou New District 
– modelled after the SIP nearby, and competed directly with the SIP for investments 
and funding, which caused Lee Kuan Yew to admit that this joint project was ‘a 
chastening experience’, and at best, ‘a partial success’ (Lee, 2000, pp. 723-724). 
Even though Singapore had close links with China, Singapore was still not as close 
as either Hong Kong or Taiwan were – their guanxi with Chinese businesses are more 
developed as compared to Singapore (Kumar, Siddique, & Hedrick-Wong, 2005, pp. 
29-63). Consequently, Singapore does face significant barriers in its entry into the 
lucrative Chinese market. Furthermore, as economic competition increases in major 
Chinese cities, it becomes increasingly difficult for Singapore to differentiate itself 
from the competition. At the same time, Singapore is also unable to match the pace 
and size of investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan into major Chinese markets, 
and so it is difficult for the city-state to play a prominent role in the rapidly maturing, 
and therefore increasingly competitive, Chinese economy (Okposin, 1999, p. 177).
Given the problems Singapore faced in China, it has been active in exploring new 
and emerging markets. During the early 1990s, India was one such market. Apart from 
gaining economic benefits through closer commercial links with India, these also play 
a significant geopolitical role in promoting a hospitable regional order for Singapore. 
It allows Singapore to project a multi-ethnic image rather than a mono-ethnic image, 
which re-assures neighbouring Muslim states that it is not overly enthusiastic in 
capitalizing on the Chinese economic bandwagon. India is a good candidate as it has 
the second largest number of Muslims in the world after Indonesia, which allows 
Singapore to distance itself from the regional perception that it is a “Third China” (B. 
Singh, 1994, p. 122) By cultivating closer relations with India, Singapore is thus not 
only able to re-assure its own Malay minority, it is also able to reduce tension with 
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Malaysia and Indonesia, making for a win-win situation (Asher & Raja, 1994, p. 1).
With  the  introduction  of  India’s  ‘Look  East’  policy,  Singapore  recognized  and 
seized the opportunity to increase economic interaction with it. Expectedly then, 
economic links constitute the foundation of Singapore-India relations, and on May 27, 
2003, Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Goh Chok Tong commissioned a joint study group 
to examine the viability of the two states in signing a Closer Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (CECA) to foster greater economic cooperation. After 13 rounds of formal 
negotiations, it was concluded on June 29, 2005. This agreement was significant as 
it represented the first time India had entered into such a comprehensive economic 
agreement with another state; likewise, it was Singapore’s first such agreement with 
a South Asian state. 
A sign of the rapidly developing economic integration after signing the CECA is 
that India became Singapore’s eleventh largest trading partner in 2007, and the 2007 
bilateral trade figures stood at SGD 23.9 billion, which were almost 20 percent higher 
than the 2006 trade figures (Singapore Government, 2008, para. 4), and the general 
upward trend can be seen in Graph 1.
The  Singapore-India  CECA  therefore  represented  the  first  step  in  economic 
integration between South and South-East Asia. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
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noted, “CECA is a strong signal that India is committed to continuing economic 
liberalization and market reforms. It heralds further moves by India to engage the 
outside world, not just ASEAN, but also with major partners” (“The Inside story,” 
2005). 
Vivian  Balakrishnan,  Minister  of  State  for  Trade  and  Industry  for  Singapore, 
regards  the  CECA  as  “a  pathfinder  for  the  ASEAN-India  FTA”  (Balakrishnan,  2003, 
Singapore-India CECA, para. 2), representing a step in the right direction as India 
aims to increase and formalize its economic interaction with the region. Signing 
an India-ASEAN FTA is important. It establishes the framework for future economic 
activities and allows all states involved greater ease into the respective markets, 
thereby increasing mutual interaction within a rules-based environment that makes 
for enhanced regional order and stability in the long-term.
Political Developments
Apart from tapping into economic opportunities present in India’s vast domestic 
market, Singapore’s early engagement of India was a reiteration of the city-state’s 
consistent belief of having a balance of power in the region. In order to achieve this 
objective, all legitimate actors must be present. Given India’s territorial size and its 
geographical proximity to South-East Asia, it is one such actor. Hence, it is imperative 
for Singapore that India is able to participate meaningfully in regional affairs as China 
is becoming increasingly influential in South-East Asia through adroit diplomacy and 
the lure of access to its vast domestic market, as well as that of the Greater China 
region.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the pre-eminent regional 
multilateral institution, and India’s participation in the regional structures constitutes 
a concrete step to realize the aim of a stable balance of power. Singapore, as India’s 
former Country Co-ordinator, was to act as a sponsor for India’s involvement with 
the region. Singapore has therefore 
played a leading role in ensuring India’s inclusion in ASEAN, first as Sectoral Dialogue Partner (at the 
Singapore Summit in 1992) and then as Full Dialogue Partner (Bangkok Summit, December 1995), which 
in turn ensured India’s membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and in India’s inclusion in the 
East Asia Summit (EAS) [in 2005]. Singapore has also supported India’s participation in the APEC Working 
Groups and India’s candidature in other multilateral fora, including UN organizations” (High Commission 
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of India in Singapore, 2008, para. 5). 
Due to Singapore’s efforts in involving India with the region, its links with ASEAN 
have improved considerably. For instance, India proposed holding annual ASEAN-India 
summits to increase the number of communication channels between them. South-
East Asian states welcomed India’s initiative and the first such summit was held in 
Phnom Penh in 2002. As Devare (2002, p. 71) notes, the venue for the first ASEAN-
India summit in Cambodia is very significant. After all, it was India’s stance on the 
Cambodian issue that was responsible for the delay in normalizing relations between 
them. Hence, holding the inaugural session in Cambodia effectively demonstrated 
that South-East Asian states and India have moved on, which augurs well for their 
future relations. These annual ASEAN-India Summits have fostered greater interaction 
and cooperation between ASEAN states and India in a number of diverse areas, and 
is in sharp contrast to their relations during the Cold War period. Judging from the 
rapid pace in the improvement of their bilateral ties, the prognosis for future bilateral 
ties is optimistic. Despite China’s head start in engaging the South-East Asian states, 
India’s recent success indicates that it is possible for the latter to close the gap and 
catch up with China, and serve as a counterweight to the latter.
In a highly symbolic act to demonstrate India’s geographical continuity with South-
East  Asia,  “draw  dramatic  attention  to  [their]  geographical  proximity”  (Vajpayee 
quoted in Ong, 2004, para. 3), as well as to “rediscover the essential oneness of our 
integrated region” (M. Singh, 2004a, para 4), India proposed an ASEAN-India overland 
rally. This idea was welcomed by the South-East Asian states, and it was held in 2004 
to coincide with the third ASEAN-India Summit. The rally started in Guwahati, capital 
city of Assam, traditionally India’s gateway to South-East Asia, and went through 
Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and concluded in Indonesia, via a ferry 
ride to Batam. The rally demonstrated the pace and extent of the improvement in 
bilateral ties since India implemented its ‘Look East’ policy. 
East Asia Summit
As  a  hedge  against  possible  Chinese  domination,  Singapore  lobbied  for  India’s 
inclusion  in  the  inaugural  East  Asia  Summit  (EAS)  in  2005.  ASEAN  states,  as  the 
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primary proponents of this new grouping that also included China, Korea and Japan, 
as well as Australia, New Zealand and India, outlined the three main conditions for 
inclusion. Firstly, states must have substantive relations with South-East Asian states; 
secondly, they must have already achieved Full Dialogue Partner status in ASEAN; and 
lastly, they must have acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Directly 
supporting India’s membership in the EAS, Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo 
stated that “India obviously qualifies on all three counts and it will be included in the 
first EAS”. Yeo also reiterated that ASEAN states retained the prerogative to decide on 
the membership of this regional bloc “to ensure that [it] remains in the driver’s seat of 
the EAS process” (“India included,” 2005). More importantly, India’s inclusion signals 
to China the ASEAN states’ collective commitment to stand firm against domination 
by any one state within this grouping (Malik, 2006a, p. 208).
The EAS was intended to be a regional institution that fostered interaction and 
cooperation in Asia-Pacific. However, Mohan Malik argues that given the historic 
rivalry between states such as Japan, China, and India, this new regional organisation 
“created more discord than accord” (Malik, 2006b, p. 1), as demonstrated by China’s 
behaviour at the inaugural summit. Then, China attempted to reduce India’s potential 
influence in the EAS by proposing that the existing members of the ASEAN Plus 
Three (APT), of which it was a member, and not the newly-expanded 16-member EAS 
grouping to “control the formation of any Asian community-building exercise” (Malik, 
2005). China’s objective was to undermine India’s ability to dilute Chinese influence 
within this fledgling regional organization, and to confine India to an outsider role 
in East Asia, an area China perceives to be its historical sphere of influence (ISEAS, 
2004, p. 37; ISEAS, 2008, p. 52; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 1). 
Just as China wants to consolidate its position, India is also very keen to establish 
a strong presence in South-East Asia “because of the uncertainties in the future, 
and especially out of her deep concern towards China’s role, the Indian government 
wants to see a multi-lateral security order in Asia-Pacific region through building 
partnerships with ASEAN” (Latif, 2004). India therefore attaches much importance 
to its participation in the EAS, which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh describes as 
“one of the most ambitious exercises of community building and integration ever 
attempted in Asia” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2007, para. 4). 
From Singapore’s perspective, it was important for India to be involved in the EAS 
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from its inception. For a balance of power to be present, no single state can be the 
preponderant power. Without a hegemonic power, inter-state interactions are more 
likely to be regulated in a manner acceptable to all states involved. By insisting on 
India’s participation at the outset despite Chinese opposition, Singapore has sent a 
clear message that regional states did not wish for China to dominate the grouping. 
Lee Kuan Yew elaborated:
It happened in an unplanned, almost accidental, way. Abdullah Badawi, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
offered to host an East Asia summit: ASEAN plus three – the three being China, Japan and South Korea. 
China’s premier Wen Jiabao, then offered to host the second summit. That would move the center [sic] 
of gravity away from Southeast to Northeast Asia and make some countries anxious. We agreed that we 
should also invite India, Australia and New Zealand and keep the center [sic] in ASEAN; also India would 
be a useful balance to China’s heft. This is a getting-together of countries that believe their economic 
and cultural relations will grow over the years. And this will be a restoration of two ancient civilizations: 
China and India. With their revival, their influence will again spread into Southeast Asia. It would mean 
great prosperity for the region, but could also mean a tussle for power. Therefore, we think that it best 
that from the beginning, we bring all the parties in together … It’s a neater balance (Lee Kuan Yew quoted 
in Elegant & Elliott, 2005, para. 2). 
Hence, it is clear that bilateral relations improved so rapidly due to the dovetailing 
of their respective strategic interests, which was also aided by their historically close 
links during the colonial period.
Defence Developments
Apart  from  increased  economic  and  political  links  between  Singapore  and  India, 
bilateral  defence  relations  have  also  shown  rapid  improvements,  which  also 
demonstrate the strides made in bilateral ties. They are significant, as high levels 
of trust are needed prior to their establishment. As early as 1994, Singapore and 
India have conducted annual naval training operations codenamed Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW) as part of the Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise (SIMBEX). 
On the tenth anniversary of the ASW, Singapore Ministry of Defence affirmed the 
exercise’s importance as a “platform for the IN (Indian Navy) and the RSN (Republic 
of Singapore Navy) to interact professionally” and in the process, has also managed 
to “foster closer relations, mutual understanding and goodwill between the two 
navies”  (Ministry  of  Defence,  2003).  Given  the  two  nations’  mutual  interest  in 
maintaining the security of the regional sea lanes, naval cooperation has proved to be 
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mutually advantageous. The close naval collaboration between them was therefore 
a confidence-building mechanism that later became a model for cooperation among 
other branches of their militaries. 
In 2003, the conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Agreement again improved 
bilateral defence ties as it facilitated the ensuing establishment of the annual India-
Singapore Defence Policy Dialogue. The dialogue aims to provide a regular forum for 
both sides to discuss defence cooperation as well as regional and defence issues. The 
first such meeting was conducted in Singapore in March 2004. Due to the presence 
of these confidence-building mechanisms, Singapore and India were able to further 
their defence cooperation. In 2004, SINDEX 04 was held in central India. In 2005, new 
grounds were broken when both militaries conducted their first joint artillery and 
armour exercises codenamed ‘Ex Bold Kurukshetra’ and ‘Ex Agni Warrior’ that were 
held at Deolali and Babina respectively.
Another sign of the maturing defence ties between them was the signing of the 
2007 Joint Military Exercises agreement. It allows the Singapore air force to train at 
Indian military bases in Kalaikunda, West Bengal, for five years, in return for payment 
and the understanding that the Singapore air force maintains and upgrades the Indian 
facilities provided (Shekhar, 2007). This military agreement is significant because it 
is the first time the Indian government has allowed the stationing of foreign troops 
on its soil. In November 2008, a three-week long joint air force training exercise 
was conducted, which Singapore’s Ministry of Defence considered as yet another 
significant milestone in bilateral defence relations (Saad, 2008).
In August 2008, both states entered into another bilateral defence agreement that 
allowed their infantry forces to undertake joint training exercises in India (Ministry 
of Defence, 2008). More significantly, India’s willingness to allow all three branches 
of the Singapore military to train there is a strong indicator of this rapidly developing 
bilateral relationship. In less than 30 years, Singapore-India defence relations have gone 
from virtually non-existent to being characterized by close and enduring cooperation 
between all three branches of their military in the present. The establishment of 
close defence ties indicates the presence of a high level of trust between the two 
states, and augurs well for even better Singapore-India relations in the future.
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Social and Cultural Developments
Improved bilateral ties are not just confined to areas of high politics discussed in 
previous sections; they are also evident in areas of low politics as there are now 
more  people-to-people  contacts  between  the  two  states.  For  instance,  there  is 
increased demand for Indian education by Indian expatriates in Singapore, which 
made it necessary to establish Indian international schools. The establishment of 
Indian international schools is significant – it not only indicates the sizable presence 
of Indian nationals in Singapore, but such high demands also indicate that Indian 
expatriates expect to be based in Singapore for extended periods. As of September 
2009, there were three Indian international schools in Singapore. Furthermore, in 
December 2008, Singapore Press Holdings launched a new weekly newspaper- tabla! - 
that targets Indian nationals based in Singapore. With the global trend of newspapers 
companies shutting down due to falling readership, the launch of an Indian weekly 
therefore  provides  strong  evidence  of  high  levels  of  people-to-people  interaction 
between Singapore and India in the present context.
Apart  from  an  increasing  expatriate  population,  the  number  of  Indian  tourist 
arrivals to Singapore has also increased as reflected in Graph 2.
Likewise, just as there are increasing numbers of Indian nationals in Singapore, 
there are increasing numbers of Singaporean nationals in India as well (Teo, 2008). 
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In  2005,  the  Indian  High  Commission  issued  60,000  business  and  travel  visas  to 
Singaporeans, and this figure increased by more than 30 percent in just two years 
to 80,000 in 2007. These healthy numbers indicate that the people-to-people links 
between Singapore and India are very strong, and augurs well for the future of their 
official bilateral ties.
Singapore’s Asian Civilisation Museum staging of the ‘Nalanda Trail’ exhibition in 
2007 also supports the above argument that there is increased social and cultural 
interaction between the two states. The exhibition was a landmark event as it was 
the first time since 1947 that India had sent such priceless historical artefacts abroad 
(Ramesh, 2007). This exhibition was possible as the two governments concluded an 
agreement in 2003 for the loan of such artefacts from the Archaeological Survey of 
India and the National Museum, New Delhi. Singapore, once again, was the first state 
to have concluded such a long-term agreement with India (High Commission of India 
in Singapore, 2003, p.1 ; Ministry of Information, 2003). 
As another sign of their rapidly developing bilateral ties on the social front, the 
Indian government invited Singapore’s deputy Prime Minister Jayakumar to be the 
chief guest of the 2007 Pravasi Bharatiya Divas conference for Indian diasporas and 
he expressed an interest in hosting the event. Just a year later in 2008, India selected 
Singapore to be the host – the first time the event had been held in another Asian 
country. To choose Singapore as the host for this international conference ahead of 
other Asia-Pacific states provides more evidence that bilateral ties between Singapore 
and India are rapidly becoming closer (Ramesh, 2008). 
Aware of such improvements in their bilateral relations, the Singapore and Indian 
governments established the India-Singapore Joint Ministerial Committee in order 
“to take stock of bilateral initiatives, exchange views on regional and international 
issues, as well as to identify new areas for cooperation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2008,  Bilateral  Relations,  para.  2).  This  joint  initiative  shows  that  political  elites 
from both states attach much importance to exploring new ways to consolidate 
and increase the present levels of cooperation between them. Given the developing 
diplomatic, economic and people-to-people contacts between Singapore and India, 
it is more accurate to describe their interactions in the present context as “deep and 
multifaceted” (Lim, 2004, para. 2), and not as ‘diplomatically distant’. In a concrete sign 
of Singapore’s devoting more importance to the Indian sub-continent, the National 
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University of Singapore set up the Institute of South Asia Studies in July 2004. This 
new institution “reflects the increasing economic and political importance of South 
Asia, and the strong historical links between South Asia and Southeast Asia” (Institute 
of South Asian Studies, 2009, Background, para. 1). In another bid to strengthen ties 
with the region, this institute set up a new project in November 2009 – South Asia 
Link –, the brainchild of President Nathan to “make Singapore the focal point for the 
30 million members of the South Asian diaspora around the world” (“Project to link 
South Asians,” 2009).
Conclusion
During the Cold War, Singapore and India did not have substantive contact with one 
another. Therefore it is fair to argue that they were not vital to each other since 
the more than 40 years of political divergence between them did not affect either 
state. The sustained period of division indicates that Singapore and India were not 
inherently pre-disposed to having excellent bilateral relations in the post-colonial 
context. The current reversal means improvement in their bilateral relations arises 
from the conscious efforts of both states. 
Advancements in the bilateral relations mainly arise from their joint recognition 
that  they  share  common  interests  that  could  be  furthered  through  conscious 
cooperation.  The  potentially  negative  developments  arising  from  China’s  rise  is 
arguably  the  fundamental  factor  that  causes  the  convergence  of  their  national 
interests. This is because both states are desirous of establishing a stable and durable 
balance of power to promote order in Asia: Singapore does not want to be dominated 
by  a  hegemonic  state;  India  does  not  want  to  be  marginalized.  Concurrently, 
Singapore’s closer engagement of India also allows Singapore to distance itself from 
the image of being a Sinic outpost that identifies with China. Given the regional 
ethnic composition, such a policy that distances itself from its ethnic identity is 
necessary to maintain a hospitable regional environment for Singapore, which is the 
only South-East Asian state to have an ethnic Chinese majority.
China implemented its economic reforms in 1978, more than a decade before 
India’s ‘Look East’ policy and so the former had a significant lead over India and has 
a more prominent economic presence in South-East Asia. Singapore is aware of this 
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development. Thus, it has consciously worked on improving its bilateral relations 
with India after the Cold War. Through closer ties with India, Singapore seeks to 
dilute Chinese influence on itself and in South-East Asia as well. To increase India’s 
presence in the region, Singapore has been keen in not only developing channels 
to increase its interaction with India, but also to ensure that these channels, once 
formed, become permanent. Likewise, India has been keen to reciprocate. This is 
because India benefits from its ability to leverage on its closer ties with Singapore to 
improve relations with other South-East Asian states, thereby increasing its regional 
presence.
Both states are aware that collaboration is mutually advantageous. Consequently 
they have concluded various agreements in diverse areas, ranging from high to low 
politics, to ensure that their nascent interactions become regular, predictable, and 
permanent. Through such agreements, they consciously affirm their commitment 
to conduct their dealings within a rules-based framework, thereby allowing their 
interaction to become orderly and mirroring the close links they had during the 
colonial period, which signals a return to history.
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